Center --> Authorizing Center:
permission request

Definitions

permission request (Information Flow): A request for permission to access or use connected vehicle applications or services. The request identifies the users that require permission, the applications or services that are requested, and the geographic coverage where the permission is required. In this context, the 'users' may be a center, infrastructure equipment (e.g., RSEs), or vehicles that are owned and operated by the requestor. This request is for an initial set of permissions. See also permission update request.

Center (Source Physical Object): This general physical object is used to model core capabilities that are common to any center.

Authorizing Center (Destination Physical Object): The 'Authorizing Center' provides the functionality needed to enable data exchange between and among mobile and fixed transportation users. Its primary mission is to enable safety, mobility and environmental communications-based applications for both mobile and non-mobile users. The Authorizing Center has some jurisdiction over limited access resources; typically this includes roadside application access and radio spectrum licensing. It may be implemented as an autonomous center or as a set of supporting services that are co-located within another center.

Included In

This Triple is in the following Service Packages:

This triple is associated with the following Functional Objects:

This Triple is described by the following Functional View Data Flows:

This Triple has the following triple relationships:

Communication Solutions

  • (None-Data) - Secure Internet (ITS) (32)
Solutions are sorted in ascending Gap Severity order. The Gap Severity is the parenthetical number at the end of the solution.

Selected Solution

(None-Data) - Secure Internet (ITS)

Solution Description

This solution is used within Australia, the E.U. and the U.S.. It combines standards associated with (None-Data) with those for I-I: Secure Internet (ITS). The (None-Data) standards include an unspecified set of standards at the upper layers. The I-I: Secure Internet (ITS) standards include lower-layer standards that support secure communications between ITS equipment using X.509 or IEEE 1609.2 security certificates.

ITS Application Entity
Mind the gap

Development needed
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Mgmt
Facilities

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Security
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TransNet
Access

Internet Subnet Alternatives
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Note that some layers might have alternatives, in which case all of the gap icons associated with every alternative may be shown on the diagram, but the solution severity calculations (and resulting ordering of solutions) includes only the issues associated with the default (i.e., best, least severe) alternative.

Characteristics

Characteristic Value
Time Context Static
Spatial Context Regional
Acknowledgement True
Cardinality Unicast
Initiator Source
Authenticable True
Encrypt True


Interoperability Description
Regional Interoperability throughout the geopolitical region is highly desirable, but if implemented differently in different transportation management jurisdictions, significant benefits will still accrue in each jurisdiction. Regardless, this Information Flow Triple should be implemented consistently within a transportation jurisdiction (i.e., the scope of a regional architecture).

Security

Information Flow Security
  Confidentiality Integrity Availability
Rating High High Moderate
Basis End entity identity and associated permissions could be contained. This PII could include that of emergency personnel, and could include permissions assigned, all of which, if easily accessed could have a high cost of recover. Flow is not realized by known standards, so it may be possible to lower it to MODERATE in the future, when it can be better characterized. Assignment of permissions with control over physical communications channels needs the greatest possible protection and cannot be mishandled or manipulated in transit. While update of this flow may be important, it is a non-real-time service in most cases. Could possibly be LOW.


Security Characteristics Value
Authenticable True
Encrypt True